Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a39a26838e6bc265…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

19.9 KB Created: 2025-06-14 16:25:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 4bedd8e2b66cc7d64b293493ef5b8942 SHA-1: d5fc860bf59dddaac2b81e73017319a6c0dc5049 SHA-256: a39a26838e6bc26502ff0b562a3a098d55c5ad5b6daf4405469ce5e11f2192a4
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

This OOXML document contains VBA macros, indicated by the 'OOXML_VBA' and 'OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN' heuristics. The 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' heuristic confirms the presence of a Shell() call within the VBA code. This suggests the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified, and no external IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
aeb575cc0c1f6137a8efe2ac9ee5f16e8938a8db71913cfe3541b23a5587e89d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1480 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
eadc4bd377e79e7b7b53a052b081a893d7155b79bf4eece310ea85016d3480e1		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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