Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a395e326e90e98f5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.3 KB Created: 2021-05-21 10:59:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-22
MD5: 051351f8d303ee9abf6af7d42c2ba09d SHA-1: e70dd3106cda2d6d5bf50293cba0e50d215d64c8 SHA-256: a395e326e90e98f51b18d0ac454e7211e66d5101c17690e8e1dee4711f02fd99
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing campaign. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links point towards an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://maypoin.ru/strik?utm_term=percentages+in+real+life+worksheet+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://dedodewoluxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134402612/mokulobab-kuzutewa-jaruseberomudiw-vutawej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://najigojuvunijo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874658/0661fba0f8652.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://beserozufem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134864657/4b6b9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sifuparara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352995/9470095.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dedodewoluxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134402612/witesizogolox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sefubokadizafa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134880044/d692a6d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wufotojinelulut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164112/6738199.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizifafub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134714450/c5219f1d421.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nozodipipagim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438171/6413818.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wokopapun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135388848/749556.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fazajamol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740605/jarawu_nukabeduju_jolukutox_katorif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://towipikegogu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134690187/varexawegebezuminud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://razebefalokugex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134895215/rasibiposelawunizif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://radugolun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134367443/rafowebunukanipivu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kafomepavazepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409794/f1eda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/53e4bf7a-3eec-4ff2-b6b2-5112b647be04/46508486274.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4bd90ce6-43fb-46e3-9bab-51a9240e602b/eliphas_levi_book_of_splendours.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/aae03193-1e48-4ac9-a7ff-aa7a77d9bbdb/savafikiduvatosi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f272.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF272 5576 bytes
SHA-256: 441c484fbe1e990557fca0b67fa8f772002b4e8df219b3413916ac808a5e0aa5
font_01_sfnt_off00010575.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10575 11272 bytes
SHA-256: 2ab61294c72cfd0b454c2a5c676d7bfd19c2dbaa0f5fa9be81c9de004b3fe691

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.