RTF malware analysis — malicious · a3930a84abb7345b

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.6 KB

MD5: 4261ec0a9edda9561c4dda5d8da7f98d SHA-1: c750e02de96c5ea52887dad328728deafdeb8e79 SHA-256: a3930a84abb7345b53130ebf9d06c2bb41bc01f39a365b8cc7e3b69f7ca4bc86

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified, and no URLs or hashes were extracted.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001b8e.bin` `d4b2f1fbe795a31cb40f38b4073fa06fa5ccdc0e7f04d705df0901f785f6e9c4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B8E	1759 bytes

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