RTF malware analysis — malicious · a3835426291b5fe7

MALICIOUS

RTF

31.1 KB First seen: 2023-05-18

MD5: 583df79ac312ae06a3a92c86e2f97c94 SHA-1: f97d480c3051ae5f5e7463857e4e0c35d8928b12 SHA-256: a3835426291b5fe7599caf12b7ce9f7ecc98e49f386b8280474f068e671aea27

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure to "Enable editing", which is a common technique to bypass macro security settings and trigger the exploit. No scripts were extracted, and the family is unknown.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004c49.bin` `5749d1f43731ed20020a05981851cae2ab28f906b147500b87f70b736967d25b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4C49	1885 bytes

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