Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a37884cfca4e9e11…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.3 KB Created: 2020-08-12 12:59:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: c455ca3f075ec8080db56943c14944af SHA-1: 46665a3d4a2d6488f3d8b0d69de36e14a59646a3 SHA-256: a37884cfca4e9e110d12f0c8bdcb49d23cb271aba05b1b2d74cf056809c8f275
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous links, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector at ttraff.com. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same URL and references to 'picture analogies worksheets for kindergarten', suggesting a lure. The presence of PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK and PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristics indicates a deliberate attempt to distribute malicious content via a link farm. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack vector appears to be directing the user to a malicious URL.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=picture%20analogies%20worksheets%20for%20kindergarten In PDF document text
    • http://files.mindorolewisvalleychurches.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814126/gigawenidexu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rotaryseymour.org/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872079/suwet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bapajivef.mremhs.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070420/6adcebb6e40484.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.genesisfamilyempowermentsociety.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453124/wupup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.strongerquicker.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408970/082cc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4179/1900/files/33008632427.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9382/7485/files/xexur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1424/8857/files/99911360967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8345/4872/files/10004684809.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/0659/8040/files/all_types_bearing_skf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4339/6506/files/foxoxabimikol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0044/6626/files/45559640101.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5031/9517/files/19972929264.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/5056/3734/files/32942770101.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9157/4430/files/31537568985.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/5055/5799/files/subnautica_power_transmitter.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6576/0151/files/12421386392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1503/5291/files/73914437294.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6296/8991/files/what_is_a_example_of_hyperbole.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/7075/7791/files/nelilotiwopajurujer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006669.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6669 5440 bytes
SHA-256: 2136daaed5c8b59819c19db5c2df3a3d0d4b797cf9d1f84be94e93e3d8ef1310
font_01_sfnt_off000078f5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78F5 10120 bytes
SHA-256: 8ff36c07e8b38245334a3b3f759f918d5302a35e19873b509e67758db4dc92a9