Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a36f793145c7a775…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

866.0 KB Created: 2022-09-26 12:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-09-26
MD5: 27a45e1df35258afd013d765d0786a32 SHA-1: 91394622f15cab0e27aa589039fbee5d57c5281d SHA-256: a36f793145c7a775fca887e5ada691ec71137678da479a476bfe70fc1e30e57f
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing a malicious VBA macro. The macro is obfuscated and uses `CreateObject` and `Shell` calls, indicating it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. ClamAV detections confirm this behavior, identifying it as 'Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10012499-0'.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10012499-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10012499-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e7e1528494c51fb385ad4b67a3aba55dd990b82dac68cfd2aa59b133199a6bbf		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 29947 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
07a3d95669079df88b1abc88c258ed81b94508dfaad87b91f417d70eeb55603c		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 34304 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.Valyria-10012499-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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