Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a321013e9fe67e0a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

228.8 KB
MD5: 4c9ed4e76700155ef9e2f1dd51e1c631 SHA-1: 38cd07c78addeaea74831432ae65905f3277186a SHA-256: a321013e9fe67e0acac93747b12ab8eac9d988bf8998a3dbfaad2aaca36d38fa
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of OLE object manipulation, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-8570 vulnerability through a composite moniker. This exploit is known to drop and execute a script, likely a second-stage payload, which is the primary malicious action observed. The embedded OLE objects and objdata sections are consistent with this exploitation technique.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000007da.bin
7fea858fc6d343a9a7a1688eb77625602fc9086fec011ce83c58e451bd9eeb51
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7DA 20579 bytes
objdata_01_off0000afaf.bin
1af484323aa51f0bc067b498458ed2106db428c7b743185ac9a6e18e7b648e31
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAFAF 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c552.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC552 12297 bytes