Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a3111161fb293f33…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

37.8 KB First seen: 2023-05-30
MD5: e5ed12329880662f70faf754e8da0c8b SHA-1: 5c885fe1701453e440ce952d70ed59bcec3aa0de SHA-256: a3111161fb293f33b38f98ca200b69a8acc2b4fd99a43fdf81b291d7e759ba80
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains heuristics indicating the presence of an embedded OLE object, specifically related to Equation Editor, and an ".objupdate" field that forces OLE activation. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'Enable editing' and implies it's from an older Office version, a typical social engineering lure to bypass macro security. This suggests the document is designed to exploit vulnerabilities or deliver a malicious payload upon user interaction.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000592d.bin
41d3b3fcf3993a742cceb640a4234e07bfc1afd6aef0422769c62e7dd35c4614
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x592D 2015 bytes