Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a30fd620e35406f9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.21 MB
MD5: 32724919bc471e1c303c6df4be3637ed SHA-1: 1442c406626035423075efe9f0610fec4091c78b SHA-256: a30fd620e35406f958eca240a0ca0fd8cf0fdbf4e265eaa18887a7d0622659b4
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file identified as an exploit carrier. High-severity heuristics indicate the presence of an Equation Editor OLE object, a common vector for exploiting vulnerabilities. The encryption with a default password further suggests malicious intent, likely to obscure the exploit or payload. No document body or scripts were extractable, but the presence of the Equation Editor OLE object strongly points to an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.