Mrdy — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a2efb34b0e95f24c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

127.5 KB Created: 2020-09-23 10:05:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: c803f166a05ee9772fbbfbdb9dd92368 SHA-1: 1e761360bcfa719c8fbaa279a7d44ee8966f7c0c SHA-256: a2efb34b0e95f24c4c23f31df9fb9dcb17cda017d57fde4892409c50a3d6c6f6
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Mrdy · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro, which is designed to execute a shell command. This command likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, as indicated by the ClamAV detection of 'Doc.Dropper.Mrdy-9765642-0' on both the original file and an extracted artifact. The presence of the AutoOpen macro and the Shell() call strongly suggests a dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Mrdy-9765642-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Mrdy-9765642-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2cf65be882ff35822d4ba2738305aefa6cd1eac06042076fedc336e9cdf8fba7
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 12869 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
76bd0592d98a1827564c85936f0522329412c22ecb6bbe6df402e9e2269335d1
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 45568 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Mrdy-9765642-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.