Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a2d6b1478fe85145…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.7 KB Created: 2021-06-09 14:56:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: cc66193c0cc9c5d7ecaaf65d32b58707 SHA-1: 94cebac811b54b2fda6d266e7db02d0f4a2d4631 SHA-256: a2d6b1478fe85145b90fa1fdba97a8c7cdd50b1d62299b223e10dd0964f824e7
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

This PDF document is classified as malicious, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing and trojan delivery mechanism. It contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress installations, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The document body, though obfuscated, contains tokens related to 'cmd network commands', and a heuristic specifically flags a 'Remote-support tool lure', indicating the document likely instructs users to install or connect to remote access software. This combination strongly suggests an attempt to trick users into downloading and executing a second-stage payload, potentially for remote control or further compromise.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=cmd+network+commands+tricks+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://webmodels.studio/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071d448cad47---lazunejegosorevidit.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://amenagementsoleil.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b3f7481fe6a---zubulojozesinigozimenalez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pet-fashion.ro/mm/file/50337283051.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.qbuildsoftware.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7a72ec0650e40b4e5ceb1b7ca608b76f/jaguwig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hieuchuan.com/upload/files/55755404823.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://segurosjdd.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/p3haf5qmj4njo8nrsc82v5pf00/pifujom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://handbook.hu/upload/page/file/jepedudaxikufozabi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stagerightstaging.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ae5ff068f8574a648c1e35bb5abe8a4b/22495484163.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.olympusnorge.no/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/05pr684osn8k589msqptce62hd/34247908039.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://innotack.com/userfiles/files/15825537986.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fieldofgreen.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8b5a21505a69e7b51324bcfdc5265bd4/30129175804.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aptchasers.com/FCKeditor/userfiles/file/bawipanumofewefirizu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://veraschwemmle.de/fckdata/file/76850786213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://prikolnaya.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/abd7790bfad3f51b73388fd5fd57962b/kesunaluwuvidagak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.grecosalesinternational.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079131050182---vefodofube.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dangkyidol.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/h1e0iqkrv3s3pjmu6n36phd2j9/91891210152.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jtour.vn/userfiles/file/jemaxesaziguvuweru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f45c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF45C 5328 bytes
SHA-256: 93e2f100b606b3917e32f6ee569b68ac530558d8bb4277a66395c38e3ba8c471
font_01_sfnt_off00010674.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10674 11772 bytes
SHA-256: 34dbf579879b29260deca0e1542d1fbb33ace21ba935e5b0a928cef28917694f

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