Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a2b5f79e72042604…

MALICIOUS

RTF

44.0 KB First seen: 2023-07-12
MD5: 7aaee11f6136d17ad54ab6f419a05adf SHA-1: a165e3891c5cf7d9c1f6b5c7911a6ced27be9cdb SHA-256: a2b5f79e72042604d8d71d5a061742427d90ecafe4e9727ab51072ca3dd9b6af
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains heuristics indicating the presence of an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor, and uses an 'Enable editing' lure to prompt user interaction. This suggests an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to execute a malicious payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body content is unrelated to the malicious indicators.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000047e0.bin
2c0676da332c89805bc1fe2620b7cf2ecac75b9f17ffaba60d56124acd128fa9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x47E0 2136 bytes