Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a2b2b03b8a4e298d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

52.7 KB First seen: 2019-10-30
MD5: 5c46fb082a683144092793529a0d10b6 SHA-1: e2762eaf35c3e9939586f97030ff0b481cc6d898 SHA-256: a2b2b03b8a4e298dc8c2b4b9d89d1a3742c5a96605516e9d98210a07a785f094
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a ProgID indicative of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, leading to exploitation and arbitrary code execution. The SHA256 hash is provided as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00008ba5.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8BA5 1774 bytes
SHA-256: 4c942bd7bd10f4bf8984450d9167b0aee458bed4dd691e311e227de5d1422741

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