Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a29535b5341a6b83…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

749.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-21
MD5: d277ddd5edd5f5cf9e2737bd8bac756b SHA-1: a8ece25f01c1b68ff0cf43af3b318418ccf84add SHA-256: a29535b5341a6b839ae264863226018c3963b3f9a8c8615e687c169cda528a29
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882 indicates the exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor OLE object. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of VBA macros, though not executable, suggests a potential delivery mechanism for the exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDI) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDI)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1d3b71b8c6234aace88f31f6e674b07383e015a2e68993dcd4fc2526aa470fe5
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2412 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
8d9d7245d11dbef1b8b7589d64db3e054d6f32c9bdbc46f1c3ff2a30c72d84f8
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD01DAE40D/ole10NAtIVE 1587 bytes