Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a25e34a9abaa62cb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

37.3 KB First seen: 2023-07-11
MD5: c62cd98740c410b813ecfbf474943f27 SHA-1: d1603d0dca694b6255e55237639d9d4a65980de8 SHA-256: a25e34a9abaa62cb16d70d5db065de56928cd87e0824605c9fef53aa331296a1
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains heuristics indicating the presence of an embedded OLE object and specifically mentions the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploits. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the embedded exploit. The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE further suggests that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening or editing.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004e04.bin
5c9cc6b3ab2644583f76f183f736e1e8d4fefd40436d37aee6f1e84dcef16fdc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4E04 1452 bytes