Formbook — Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a25de37e75b85c86…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

186.4 KB First seen: 2022-03-02
MD5: df85ee047948f0496361c7cfc1fc07ae SHA-1: 573ffdea6475e17d5f945bc323a2c00b77fbf9ef SHA-256: a25de37e75b85c86cc53e0a584e0411b2103fafeb43398a523f330082cee3c88
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Formbook · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an encrypted Office document identified by ClamAV as Doc.Downloader.Formbook. Heuristics indicate it uses an Equation Editor OLE object (CLSID offset 0x450) to exploit CVE-2018-0798. The encrypted nature and the specific ClamAV detection strongly suggest a downloader functionality, likely for Formbook malware. No scripts were extracted, but the exploit carrier shape and the OLE object point to a malicious payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.