Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a23c5e1e0f6a1944…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.7 KB Created: 2020-10-30 22:02:32 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 32d14ac0b6d88a6a6fa8675b93398303 SHA-1: 497728e2824c09b5b7e3118f4bde636f736089ee SHA-256: a23c5e1e0f6a194432270ef93c54af5e8387f4244fe771c9dd0040c9a1a5b773
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially malicious content. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/wb?keyword=dna%20codon%20table%20pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389085/normal_5f968a35e5fc4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://segakimorepej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738797/mureb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384639/normal_5f923d38630e8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://notupazepikinis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134382888/8e2b626d56d17b7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365628/normal_5f9ab1c0637c0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408187/normal_5f95684ec6647.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xirunokud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134467368/dikufugini-sipomulikivif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4386842/normal_5f9119cb9faae.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://digafixi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776371/6996352.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://debasomi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739769/vutebavibo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dojulukasinu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776790/7789696.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/72f3839f-5515-4dcc-860c-46e78d57c821/eu4_client_state.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c84326e5-fb4a-40bc-abab-81a53d748ce7/sizunobevifagajokesumozem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/61a8e552-27e8-4ded-a8b1-95fdae501575/mysql_books.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zurovajij/face_benjamin_zephaniah_download_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gupuso/67174314071.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006783.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6783 4756 bytes
SHA-256: 0090393101608b903eca7620c85dcb2c31165813c9f7cff146e442faf26b8e72
font_01_sfnt_off000077b7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x77B7 10484 bytes
SHA-256: 2e9c12cfe3a82ef2783531fb17ef78b94bf572310b0a295fe4748f44b16e30b0
font_02_sfnt_off00009b87.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9B87 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

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