Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a1fcc2de19c49990…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.63 MB
MD5: 407c8b693e115798a1aabbec6b300624 SHA-1: 850d61a923e4231f22f6093f9f9a594b9f34ee77 SHA-256: a1fcc2de19c499902cf1f8b243af4e25bb097e519ffaea2266129d2e635b1368
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of excessive hex-encoded data within the object suggests it is used to hide a malicious payload. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit method is clear.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1707KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003e.bin
0469b7bcf88dd470ddaa14e2ad338c6f5f5f17238e367d9fc8f858d3e433e589
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E 853574 bytes