Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a1f63e2b447fa261…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.9 KB Created: 2021-02-18 12:46:23 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 81af6baa6776c4b3cf500e05c1f797c9 SHA-1: d97a47be7809c1ddcdfc67ddd3d8ef52a51052c4 SHA-256: a1f63e2b447fa261c6169ad8283c2e0032d996cc74d5e196add567ee789f232c
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with at least one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body is heavily obfuscated and appears to be junk data, offering no clear narrative. The primary attack vector appears to be tricking the user into clicking malicious links within the document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wix?keyword=namekian+dragon+balls+xenoverse+2 In PDF document text
    • http://questotzvezd.space/android_studio_build_apk_failedm8dfq.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://storefromit.pro/solabawanijuvwfd45.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bred-enligne.com/15703694876y66l8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mudifuto/chcia2i/zowasefutuwudeboxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4418764/normal_60268fd441e0a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://siankaanmexico.com/bear_with_me_trophy_guidevkqw0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://mulukamuzadesew.epizy.com/30009650045.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/desekusoxi/comic_book_free_cbr.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fepavipa.epizy.com/39700005481.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dajajubofu.rf.gd/zixozopijijizigodu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zakuvusebaj.epizy.com/dopere.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zewimu/aristotle_politics_hackett.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/liluvad/test_coombs_indirecto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://regisebe.epizy.com/company_event_invitation_template.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001060c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1060C 3816 bytes
SHA-256: 7e2b205894708a5c0bb07bbbab3a2284efa90e85f45f707a0562e2994ef7e290
font_01_sfnt_off000113a1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x113A1 5580 bytes
SHA-256: 30e9982de41806ff6209a37e082cedbeab85e38f29e9ba1f22f84570ad4e1277
font_02_sfnt_off00012690.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12690 10512 bytes
SHA-256: 899e32d74f0d323beaa5768becac5a7e9975f91af936eecc7dbf7510077570e7

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