Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a1af06d583c51b24…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

933.7 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: b926f2c0ad1eea87fd3e3e359fb19861 SHA-1: adc3b26ab4e8b401f32d2c97ee0e588bdbb5af2e SHA-256: a1af06d583c51b24455fd6820af4286146baaa2a47193a4d5ba9cb2adc977c60
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability in MSXML that allows for OLE object activation. This suggests the document is designed to deliver a malicious payload by exploiting this vulnerability when opened.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000e494b.bin
200989b92732f9bd9a80fab14830ea1b6c75d3b09bde5c09a1887f15c20402f7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE494B 3739 bytes