Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a17b71700fc15776…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.1 KB Created: 2020-08-22 17:08:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4ec19951bb8a18aa4dde2510c644bc68 SHA-1: 973d8f2c6d43e3e3d902f304191331dc41fe0b1d SHA-256: a17b71700fc15776c74ed11fb506785ef5097f60df3f9bd879d0bccc8947617a
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a link farm and a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector. The document body text, though heavily obfuscated, contains the URL that is also flagged as malicious. This suggests the PDF is designed to redirect users to malicious infrastructure, likely for further exploitation or credential harvesting. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis of the payload.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=management+reporter+2012+process+service+keeps+stopping
    • http://files.grpgifts.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712315/fe63017e6592876.pdf
    • http://lamifunes.presentingyourpast.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453133/e99365.pdf
    • http://files.saintlouisspeed.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071082/2727101.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1243/1770/files/17421267175.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/5650/5756/files/40437832333.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3762/1404/files/34357093866.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7745/1428/files/3006125149.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/4615/6960/files/econ_101_homework_4_answers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7407/6315/files/wmor_tv_schedule.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/9744/6818/files/dissertation_problem_statement.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5131/0486/files/56700864728.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/0898/1152/files/46922828935.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1405/4300/files/kuwuninuwewadeju.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005fad.bin
bffd1a32814bdef6a9e1f6e0c8a72227270819536caffd63f7384faa17f50523
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5FAD 5676 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007301.bin
2c28577838e1113f31b53d95d10c963a3a318f94fffff26ab4cac2858a2a57e9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7301 10740 bytes