Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a173b1ad98a85356…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: 1f48f725e1a5894937bb7ad89acbdfa4 SHA-1: ad2ef4961481534651d4f9971b2e5f93ef58f5b6 SHA-256: a173b1ad98a853561bdfd1af7f41316c47c49672ba4df20ae824166a66f953fe
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000096.bin
27b2515aa2f5d486904fb2cc25dddea06c0fbeb2a624d230e671ebdfd8d30a7c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x96 1534 bytes