Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a16b1c3f4d57c5f1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

153.0 KB Created: 2008-07-11 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 80751239e794d8c18bb8fc641d717281 SHA-1: 0e4c9917cb98d90dbf5ba4d0f947261bb14e8e3b SHA-256: a16b1c3f4d57c5f15fdf1f4cd686a0717b40d0f17950884af3009959217fb89b
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OLE document exhibits an unusually large slack space and contains appended executable-looking payload bytes. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of appended executable data strongly indicates the file is designed to deliver a secondary payload. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 156,672 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,543 bytes — 140,129 bytes (89%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.