Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a16588c52e166081…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: d507a44d2f2f453f6bf5c917074c45b3 SHA-1: aa481c224bcbdcb76fb779e08a2aaf5299a28f39 SHA-256: a16588c52e16608121892037547cdb392e94b31d9b764ecd90abc2f19e05225c
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to exploitation. This pattern is commonly used to deliver a malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000096.bin
dbf5ca48f43f927f8125cee90a7eb3470f32b1f1739cbb5eb4635f3ef2a4f8fd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x96 1620 bytes