Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a16394c6e78a7eb3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.6 KB Created: 2010-08-29 16:19:36 Authoring application: styeZek colSnap
MD5: 5b3e24e65610a6df05a377b62e18bcf9 SHA-1: 3b1d3bf19c8ec3d33b8ebde73dc31695c30959f8 SHA-256: a16394c6e78a7eb3c01d2a092f467f2c78178c40e9c9151a001e0dcec8aae977
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The critical PDF_XFA_SCRIPT heuristic indicates that the XFA form contains risky executable script. This, combined with the PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD firing, strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability to run malicious code. The embedded URL, while benign, is often a component of such attack chains. The ClamAV detection of 'Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81' further supports this assessment, pointing to a known exploit pattern for dropping additional malware.

Heuristics 6

  • XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x1E9 84 bytes
embedded_file_obj0009.bin
24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x298 228 bytes
embedded_file_obj0010.bin
911c4464525ddc91a1c980b7c4116e00e87865a507d2faeb575d1b5a6bbedc4f
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x38B 1289 bytes
embedded_file_obj0011.bin
c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x6A7 199 bytes
embedded_file_obj0012.bin
52fac05aa06a1632ede8b7b3c379837f87dcbc9b727eb906c14ea959d97fc337
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x799 33975 bytes
embedded_file_obj0013.bin
e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x41A4 77 bytes
embedded_file_obj0014.bin
92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x424B 56 bytes