Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a129273dd440ddea…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

48.0 KB First seen: 2022-09-07
MD5: 0a4bc684067046a0caf33fa9309b4e49 SHA-1: 913ea24bee93b6839853f608f43b971eb1785923 SHA-256: a129273dd440ddeaaab4a2d19f36599156df8539a93f1cd59f42f9e7bfeb6a15
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1071.001 Web Protocols T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The file is an encrypted Office document, identified as an exploit carrier for CVE-2017-0199. It contains an embedded URL that likely serves as a remote loader for a secondary malicious document. The exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 allows for the download and execution of arbitrary files from a remote source.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dummy_username@192.210.201.56/...--------.-------------------.._---_-----_-------/www_j/www.doc