Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a11e24c76ce6ac9c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

130.5 KB Created: 2008-07-11 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 876c659240df35eeff17c5256bf8513f SHA-1: d7e30c33f33c8fb4949ec56ddc3b75b49f3aff8b SHA-256: a11e24c76ce6ac9ca44f42c4beec8ed964e0cc19b962fdd73f3fc1a856c4206e
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OLE document exhibits significant slack space and appended executable-looking payload bytes, strongly suggesting it functions as a dropper. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of appended code is a high-confidence indicator of malicious intent. The document body is minimal and does not provide further context.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 133,632 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,543 bytes — 117,089 bytes (88%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.