Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a119411810ffb217…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.0 KB Created: 2021-07-18 23:49:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: e975199565164f9d1e6052b1262d3994 SHA-1: 64b60f5eb1dd3b9fd8223774438f29cf3c347b97 SHA-256: a119411810ffb217868fb15b4c44239a5ba67bc98b5605182ec9cce2fe1c8c91
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains multiple links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress installations or disposable domains, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of numerous suspicious URLs points to an attack pattern involving directing users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9704

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://higher-reason.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5rriiigebihvdnuurnl36tqg86/36052570030.pdf
    • https://www.marbelitesa.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160709a93732a2---35572791233.pdf
    • http://www.jimenez-casquet.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bb6a91d2050---85406859709.pdf
    • http://www.agrosystem.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160952463744a0---jegigikijenisenotora.pdf
    • http://www.telsercom.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16088ae75f3c82---72382439507.pdf
    • https://mkontakt.pl/dat//file/65842547924.pdf
    • https://criteriacambio.com.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/492mcjibqgia338mi54qpuupg6/50030498224.pdf
    • https://xlux.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ncoca7u6k5gke254k6vvnff8kb/96059391350.pdf
    • https://earthchartercities.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608e0fa043f68---vokebaser.pdf
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskyroyalshakespeareglobetheatrelondon.com/clientMedia/file/37580669340.pdf
    • https://www.couleurs-et-jardin.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bc939c7311c---34424969165.pdf
    • https://bursakaynak.com/userfiles/file/basuziwewekojifadisiwete.pdf
    • http://woods-china.cn/ci2/userfiles/files/20210606100212.pdf
    • https://www.varisistanbul.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607710028ad6d---bitevukipixoximozax.pdf
    • https://zold-kommando.hu/files/38094911563.pdf
    • https://best-turbos.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d7a6a94676296337568827a6550d534c/11681848981.pdf
    • http://www.yourhealthyourchoice.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b433ac8bc39---kiwugunijaxuvaradafitug.pdf
    • https://studiogreenwich.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/85206553751137901965ea523be6d963/firomubofotuxajuko.pdf
    • http://yaeram.com/userData/board/file/vubunuripinuzusatutifijit.pdf
    • https://dazzlin.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8ab2de5f165871ba4977e8f8a89f9382/wirovudikaboweterudelo.pdf
    • https://www.emma-solutions.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608742471f16a---35428586251.pdf
    • http://ankurgroups.com/userfiles/file/13099106371.pdf
    • https://www.hintonassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f22b86283a7136523e4d11b9a35261e5/wejagu.pdf
    • https://wentworthre.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/712ac0d343db2b40a24da7bb96d03e12/88426481088.pdf
    • http://broadgatecapital.com/userfiles/file/safawetebimafaxefezigal.pdf
    • http://veterinariogiardinelli.it/userfiles/files/nexuvekox.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=to+be+verb+in+korean
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000117e7.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x117E7 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012ffe.bin
27dc78e5148a13674d3a41a7519869903a9c0d6d3db65d2ff5791e722cb34a97		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12FFE 10052 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001466d.bin
1213f7d516e947cd175798f1d96041f1610e35b1af11728167d255dfd44759f4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1466D 1836 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00014f08.bin
c2d010853dc328cbe185efaaa9cad661f50ac0638f72da8c3b23c4c92b54d782		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14F08 17360 bytes

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