Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a100c0fad9efd655…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.0 KB Created: 2020-10-31 05:42:20 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-11
MD5: 495e4426d2ece5c70bff13b3b5e70e63 SHA-1: 16396aeb6b0e411ac1a04e270c88ca9529b2e96f SHA-256: a100c0fad9efd655aa7c19ea9bf3017ab3a2b7bfe7e451968ddcb71cf479e78a
274 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=umn+google+drive In PDF document text
    • https://fawefugixizim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383791/3772485.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415546/normal_5f952e6ce28ea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373248/normal_5f8b08268b081.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tofizo/14702000038.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f7b1e625-c7f0-4e3d-a5b1-d4c7da0e7b3a/53777728157.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/21e64135-78b3-43c8-b3df-9125d9efa907/32138543978.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zetare/67549421631.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1cdde797-279e-4a4c-bdd1-772eb3b6be48/sobimovejisapagixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2138c48e-721e-4639-a396-6dbfdd1db523/25750439525.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wekibik/articles_explanation_and_exercises.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8de461a8-355c-45a7-8c9c-0c5e11689730/tejojawamulek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/754fda33-0a51-4d27-9010-67b3532c7bbb/remouse_standard_4.1_license_key.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/19a2dc24-4eb5-4ec2-904e-08f68270af9e/57906048646.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jepavilutabilel/82575280543.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3080/5669/files/viduxeviwizipixol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000062fc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x62FC 4516 bytes
SHA-256: 4549816c79f3b699d619a10a32ae0dd65ab019a3454c00642b01c6eeb2d93626
font_01_sfnt_off00007229.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7229 10400 bytes
SHA-256: b76303c6fe5530f6f1be2a132ba32aaffa6fca4d34718dce6fb65b43271ec151
font_02_sfnt_off000095a0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x95A0 4324 bytes
SHA-256: d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378