Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a0fddbb638fc4f3b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

714.7 KB Created: 2022-08-24 06:46:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-08-26
MD5: 734b2d5832aab48287256115853ea84b SHA-1: cafcd26c7c9fb209319e479437bc90eb1cd601e9 SHA-256: a0fddbb638fc4f3ba4cefc0707226e8c01eefd98f78d6a9b4fbca1ba74b21adf
362 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic for Applications T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine that is designed to construct and save a PowerShell command. This command is intended to download a second-stage payload from the URL 'sectionss.scienceontheweb.net/account'. The presence of a password-protected archive lure and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature.

Heuristics 9

  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10021468-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10021468-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
3d5349ff18ebd65df6d7a0322c524c86adaeac5df2aa463b1ef16538f2722db6
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2590 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
2e7bb17e060c350ed493ece4cd77fb030d575f290a7f5436cfc75acfc16db760
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10021468-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely