Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a0fb32f628ede942…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.8 KB First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: a962465375252179efa58de7dbf62428 SHA-1: 630be7c451bb82d8a329fbe2d4ce95d004f9ccd8 SHA-256: a0fb32f628ede942f23db97d5d7c96240a772a39b6a1657052e80e0a6492e903
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of a known vulnerability to achieve code execution. This is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload, although no specific URLs or scripts were extracted to confirm this.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001825.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1825 1925 bytes
SHA-256: 9cab5e7a3f7371ae77fc0dea3a26d71c9ea28c55a56ce7a8ecebc002e8815154