Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a0db224da86b1649…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

106.6 KB First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: 23d4ca57dcc421f6d92e2c86525df601 SHA-1: a881ea0ec59c800963a504bf942c25b398aefb73 SHA-256: a0db224da86b16491b66872d4d9f8755ed6fdf8b99ab3008dbdb016c3c4ccac0
62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The presence of a legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro (AutoOpen) indicates an attempt to automatically run malicious code upon opening the document. The OLE slack space anomaly further suggests that the file has been tampered with or contains hidden malicious content. The embedded URL, though benign, is noted as part of the document's structure.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 109,191 bytes but its declared streams total only 59,656 bytes — 49,535 bytes (45%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)