Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a0d2f4d264f588bb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.2 KB
MD5: ba3d63b268cb9ba962f6a61f3b8847c3 SHA-1: bd3e01b68620e3652347feb7bcd38bc2e91533c3 SHA-256: a0d2f4d264f588bb0aca08b49201ed5eb15cdc37442a076502bbee40588d669d
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

This PDF document is flagged as malicious due to the presence of an embedded exploit targeting CVE-2010-0188 in Adobe Reader's LibTIFF component. The heuristic 'PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD' indicates an embedded script, and the 'CVE_2010_0188' firing confirms the exploit's nature. The embedded URL is likely part of the exploit chain or a secondary download mechanism. The document's purpose is to leverage this exploit to gain initial access.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin
c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0xD2A 85 bytes
embedded_file_obj0042.bin
dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0xDDC 1029 bytes
embedded_file_obj0111.bin
fb5f8458e25738bbf0b3e5631aa4384308ad3fd1763b4273cb1cdc7750b41f9c
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 111 at offset 0xFF6 57316 bytes
embedded_file_obj0044.bin
3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x1F7D 144 bytes
embedded_file_obj0045.bin
10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x202A 77 bytes