Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a0ca09ee81e88ce7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 9fcc856b98a8736ff09c46f2681c1b21 SHA-1: a280758e7dc9a99b092d5113b46e8abc71c8b6c5 SHA-256: a0ca09ee81e88ce7a6019326af5fc378911220c47b360528112400c9d599e72f
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation and automatic OLE object activation. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve code execution. No specific malware family could be identified, and no further IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000047.bin
180cda7d2e74318bd63eefede4d992de3fcc0aef973f0f59047c5bb9e3fb823f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x47 1812 bytes