Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a0bd935ff283de79…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.1 KB Created: 2020-07-08 20:29:24 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-25
MD5: 61d34f48b5aa698d50c211649ad443a5 SHA-1: ac050854fc8530c356dbecbc0a5c98f3b8ea033e SHA-256: a0bd935ff283de79e99a25425682f751a1d7930bb789c2e2b608176e978bdaf4
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, identified as a link farm, with one link pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body also contains a URL that appears to be part of a lure. This suggests the primary purpose is to redirect users to malicious sites, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=alkalise%20or%20die%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.crosslights.net/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872048/zuposaropefeva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rcdavis-tellinstories.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383624/ebc2656e5828c5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.flatspokecycles.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408529/6549756.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.changingfutures.org.uk/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606087/mufegesitawiko-matuwomap-xivekun-vokozufeletefuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lisassalonspa.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302999/3641bf5cc9242.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.peepspeak.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872285/wepudebatagu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cobilconnect.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969853/6ea8d66a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.postichewigs.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454172/6562926.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://titoxed.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/lixiboder.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riwozuxel.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/vufazoxifebajupuzuxawolu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puxofiguf.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/xejitudewedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nojisaxopo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/lotojixavinidorigilig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bikaluvamu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/75839443471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fitugugapet.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/94440525176.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/baxumedufimoval.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/62114329075.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/mujunevuduw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/72163988246.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007765.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7765 4692 bytes
SHA-256: 25eba980d587bd3fcbc68d91d890047e4a87333e22b4cbb4a8d7c2ef2492f223
font_01_sfnt_off0000875c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x875C 10628 bytes
SHA-256: 126ab2098a00a6b9d8a3221e3f7b56672b2eb9f7891904d4fa61e33516bc14ed

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