Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a097d4b84dd018f2…

MALICIOUS

RTF

102.0 KB First seen: 2024-09-22
MD5: 8ba173734c1a8532e0b2ebcb3b6602ab SHA-1: d1bc301bef4618313617c907be8d1e1300892621 SHA-256: a097d4b84dd018f20a2d9593aa3786d7f76bc360c27d332859c059a65d98150b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to the execution of a malicious payload. This is a common technique for delivering malware via exploits.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000152b.bin
facff500b424a954ce735ad38b83422c2416f691d5229249502068c300af0ec3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x152B 1798 bytes