Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a09734b4bc360012…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

804.5 KB
MD5: d964b3c807642771daa49a27fd3caae0 SHA-1: bad341c876660e04d8a0e0091c909b3d07acfeff SHA-256: a09734b4bc3600127ef0f3ba2ac532c19937a8b640e16bc8f852b06f045302f0
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains an embedded OLE object identified as an Equation Editor exploit carrier. This suggests the document is designed to deliver a malicious payload through a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. No document body or scripts were extractable due to encryption, limiting further analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.