Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a08dfc16042626ed…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

37.0 KB Created: 2021-07-31 11:04:51 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint 16.0000
MD5: a420ce14f1f707e0c8ed4fb9400be6c8 SHA-1: e63a46e732dc5d0eb71036117530eb8220e7ac9b SHA-256: a08dfc16042626ed03606938ce0d1f05274374c1e2ae65799e4d30f490179752
422 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros that utilize WScript.Shell and WMI to execute commands. The 'DownloadAndExecute' subroutine explicitly downloads a file from 'https://anonfiles.com/v4h3J296u4/cyclone_encrypt_exe' and attempts to save it to 'C:/Users/Public/AppData/Temp', indicating an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload. The use of AutoOpen and Shell() calls further supports this malicious behavior.

Heuristics 10

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://anonfiles.com/v4h3J296u4/cyclone_encrypt_exe

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
21054be747ff723c673ee7f2bc034f19107d4862dd7504c276b69119b6937741		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2376 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
f5d4fb8ed267bc808af83b603d9f3b47bdd251804f5c70b79b823626ce2f4031		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 15872 bytes

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