Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · a083b9bdb768a03a

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.86 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: 3f6f64703f40eea7405289c0dcba607a SHA-1: cb297e8d902a5d05e4f01b4619d08acf95a1f7d9 SHA-256: a083b9bdb768a03a97d19da3e997e147d66430738d4aa27b6a852de0c537a6e6

108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell T1071.001 Web Protocols: HTTP

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource from 'https://peprolinbot.es/um9Uyh?&resolution'. The embedded PDF also shows suspicious static findings. While VBA macros were present, they contained no executable statements. The presence of an embedded URL suggests a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 4

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL https://arpo-sa.com/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`font_00_sfnt_off000010ab.bin` `41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB	88240 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00136a00.pdf` `f23e8f77d9d49f0a29d2b4fb996472e50c600bdfe573dcc68583c4a626af413b`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x136A00	678400 bytes

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