PDF malware analysis — malicious · a078e32783ead67a

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.5 KB

MD5: d05e6952ae56fedd1928453d22f19724 SHA-1: 7cf7f2e0f368ec7c03ceeffe207b0177c94c22ed SHA-256: a078e32783ead67a6a0fcc0b0ca4fb7a0291d515e0f8d7a7eb98c98bf12325dd

194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

This PDF file exploits CVE-2007-5659 using obfuscated JavaScript. The script acts as a dropper, downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The presence of multiple JavaScript streams and the 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901' ClamAV signature strongly indicate a malicious exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 8

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER

PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE

String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0009_000.js` `4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x436B	469 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js` `4c9afa5d66b6ac0970bfba7cc8a118f5a5fa2b3d50d7b636b1721ad1594ea1d0`	deobfuscated-js	z-percent UTF-16BE base-21 decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1ABE	5317 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `87e5e4aa97046716f92d987d3693c4c27ef58f6a736a8dbee754b97d78b84b18`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	173941 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).

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