Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a06188151500ab35…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.04 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 7ea90b8d046abdaf047adb2817c7d9a3 SHA-1: 615675cbd62960243356850e7b9dd99658ceeaf3 SHA-256: a06188151500ab3550d42989fe455c6cc47f1442ca186628a14d092f0a0b127f
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000ef01a.bin
8af9f46482e0e47dbe82ac9a2211abee576fca8ea784e0c60f9a0a1bd8f6ed11
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xEF01A 3732 bytes