Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a056eb261b434616…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

33.0 KB First seen: 2023-05-26
MD5: df21bafef819ff45723285ce44bbbe27 SHA-1: 6bec4ebd39c72c9d6021c375fc75ab1ebfc0e43a SHA-256: a056eb261b4346163237f45be32799e475b26a422bd374c52b52f283e9d5976b
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which is a common tactic to trigger malicious content. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" further suggests the exploitation of an OLE object vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000042cd.bin
82377080e503c98929017f79ffe7d37c979b337c6a6e2a4fcd66e27ade13fd53
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x42CD 1533 bytes