Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a03e2b1333dc79c0…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.2 KB
MD5: d445b44b4f34a134324b3a810f106212 SHA-1: 96de33666e1f36a34a091e41bf26d593e961c65f SHA-256: a03e2b1333dc79c0bcd49d15c68225f87853c2fbb45fcb3172332de98d273f5f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a known flaw in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE object activation.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000bd.bin
9f287443392963ac21e2f20df18b826464358b66eb5190fb630947e294a4c243
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBD 1819 bytes