RTF malware analysis — malicious · a02d2abb1a7da092

MALICIOUS

RTF

54.8 KB First seen: 2024-12-04

MD5: f11a6a0e8ae4ccc1c4a311e48b8f464e SHA-1: 6bcd811bf12fa142a18f9710a7b24334530c0807 SHA-256: a02d2abb1a7da0921aa1fa2d4ae713062b16cda330e9755556c2950f7e413398

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The RTF document contains critical heuristics indicating the use of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) and an OLE object that forces activation (RTF_OBJUPDATE). The embedded OLE object data (objdata_00_off00002112.bin) is the likely exploit mechanism. This pattern suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code, commonly used to download and run additional malicious components.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002112.bin` `01798559b2c6cc00fc0bf320105763bdb98d45bcbba66e03c160b3183025e737`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2112	1890 bytes

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