Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a02aa1ee5e270c9d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

64.8 KB Created: 2007-12-03 01:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: dab82802997563a4e6e4255f9dd722a1 SHA-1: 94493ae10d0633518179a3a6e0e4b6570a46491d SHA-256: a02aa1ee5e270c9daf45415c4aede4b27a292e47e5bccda30963977c7d0a95ee
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OLE document exhibits anomalies indicative of malicious intent, including a large slack region and an appended executable payload. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of an appended payload suggests the document is designed to deliver a secondary stage. The file's SHA256 hash is a primary indicator for tracking this threat.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 66,355 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,486 bytes — 49,869 bytes (75%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.